

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 NEAE-00 SS-15 NSCE-00
SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SY-05 ACDA-12
EA-10 AF-10 MCT-01 /116 W
-----000451 131831Z /53

P 131700Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO USICA WASHDC PRIORITY
SEKSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4769
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
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E.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJECT: FORGED INTERVIEW WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE

1. ON MORNING OF JULY 13, PARIS-BASED CORRESPONDENT
OF ISRAELI NEWSPAPER HA'ARETZ, ELIE MAISSI (WELL KNOWN
TO POST), NOTIFIED ICA PARIS THAT HE HAD RECEIVED
IN HIS REGULAR MAIL AT HOME JULY 12 IN PLAIN YELLOW
ENVELOPE, A COPY OF WHAT OBVIOUSLY IS A FORGED INTER-
VIEW WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE. INTERVIEW IS DATED
JULY 11, 1978 AND IS TITLED VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE
TALKS TO KARL DOUGLAS (DOUGLAS NOT KNOWN
TO POST AND WE ARE UNABLE TO TRACE ANY AFFILIATION).
FIRST PAGE OF FOUR-PAGE INTERVIEW WAS ON XEROXED
COPY OF EMBASSY PRESS RELEASE MASTHEAD. SO FAR WE
HAVE NOT HEARD OF THE FORGED INTERVIEW SURFACING
ELSEWHERE. WE PROPOSE DENY AUTHENTICITY IF QUERIED.
VERBATIM TEXT OF INTERVIEW FOLLOWS WITH
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SPELLING AND PUNCTUATION ERRORS AS APPEAR ON
FORGERY. WILL SUPPLY FURTHER DETAILS AS KNOWN.

2. HEADING: VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE TALKS TO KARL
DOUGLAS JULY 11, 1978. EXCERPTS.
QUOTE: DOUGLAS. MR. VICE PRESIDENT, FIRST OF ALL I
WANT TO THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF MY NEWSPAPERS' READERS

FOR AGREEING TO SEE ME...

MONDALE. NOT AT ALL, EVERYONE HERE KNOWS MY DOOR IS OPEN TO ALL COMERS. I HAVE TIME UNTIL 4 O'CLOCK.

Q. THEN I'LL COME RIGHT TO THE POINT. MR. VICE PRESIDENT, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE TREND IN AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SALT TALKS? WHEN MAY WE EXPECT A SALT AGREEMENT?

A. I GUESS YOU COULDN'T HAVE FOUND A MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION TO LEAD OFF WITH, BUT I WILL SUM UP MY OPINION BRIEFLY ON THIS COMPOSITE QUESTION WHICH HAS SUCH VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE WHOLE WORLD. AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS HAVE DETERIORATED, IN FACT DECLINED, DURING RECENT MONTHS. SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, THE STRENGTHENING OF THE AGGRESSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THE STALLING OF THE SALT DISCUSSIONS HAVE CREATED SERIOUS TENSIONS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

Q. A FEW MONTHS AGO IT SEEMED - AND PRESIDENT CARTER AFFIRMED THIS SEVERAL TIMES IN PUBLIC - ONLY CERTAIN UNIMPORTANT POINTS NEEDED TO BE CLEARED UP BEFORE SIGNING THE SALT II AGREEMENT.

A. YES, MORE THAN ONCE IT LOOKED AS IF ALL SERIOUS HARDSLES HAD BEEN CLEARED AND IT WAS A MATTER OF DAYS OR WEEKS AND SALT II WOULD BE SIGNED, YET NOTHING HAPPENED. AT THE LAST MINUTE THE SOVIET UNION EITHER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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MADE ANOTHER POLITICAL MOVE OR CAME UP WITH A NEW PROPOSAL WHICH PREVENTED THE SIGNING OF THE SALT II AGREEMENT WE ALL ARE SO ANXIOUS TO SEE CONCLUDED.

Q. WHAT POLITICAL MOVES DO YOU HAVE IN MIND?

A. MEASURES OF BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY. TAKE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA IN SHABA, OR THE POLITICAL TRIALS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE SOVIETS PRESENTING PROPOSAL AFTER PROPOSAL WHILE THEY STEADILY EXPAND

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ACTION NEA-10

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L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SY-05 ACDA-12

EA-10 AF-10 MCT-01 /116 W

-----000473 131830Z /53

P 131700Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO USICA WASHDC PRIORITY

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THEIR ARSENAL OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY. FOR EXAMPLE THERE IS THE SS-20 BALLISTICS MISSILE WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE SOVIET THREAT TO MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. I MENTION THIS MERELY TO ILLUSTRATE ONE OF THE MANY THINGS WHICH CONFLICT WITH OUR GOALS. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE FURTHER REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO THE STRICTER LIMITATION OF UPDATING AND NEW DELIVERY SYSTEMS, BUT WE CANNOT DO IT ALONE. IF THE SALT II TALKS ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL THE SOVIET UNION MUST DISPLAY THE SAME COMMITMENT.

Q. FROM WHAT YOU SAY, YOU BELIEVE THE EVENTS IN AFRICA ARE ALSO HAVING A BROAD NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE SALT II TALKS...?

A. YES, THAT IS VERY TRUE. IN OUR OPINION THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS MUST NOT BE CONFINED TO ONE OR TWO CONTINENTS. NOT ONLY EUROPE, BUT AFRICA ALSO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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WANTS TO BENEFIT FROM REDUCED TENSIONS, AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. PRESENT SOVIET POLICY IN AFRICA HAS NOTHING IN COMMON WITH THIS NOBLE GOAL. WHEN CAN WE EXPECT A SALT II AGREEMENT? IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO GIVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER AT THIS MOMENT BECAUSE SO MUCH COULD HAPPEN IN THE INTERIM. IN ALL EVENTS ONE THING IS SURE, WE WILL NOT CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT AT ANY PRICE, WE WILL WAIT PATIENTLY UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION COMES UP WITH A PROPOSAL ACCEPTABLE TO US. FULLY AWARE OF THE PRESENT STATUS

OF THE DISCUSSIONS, I WOULD CLOSE THE QUESTION BY SAYING I HAVE NO HOPES FOR A QUICK SOLUTION. I AM CONFIDENT THOUGH WE WILL BE ABLE TO WRAP UP A SALT II AGREEMENT IF NOT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THEN IN THE DISTANT FUTURE.

Q. I BELIEVE THAT AND SO DO OUR READERS. FOR LONG YEARS NOW THE MIDDLE EAST HAS CONTAINED THE DANGER OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT DO YOU THINK ON THIS SCORE NOW, ESPECIALLY AFTER VISITING ISRAEL AND EGYPT?

A. I THINK IT IS GOING TOO FAR TO TAKE SUCH A GLOOMY AND PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE QUESTION SINCE BASICALLY THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED BY THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, FIRST OF ALL BY ISRAEL AND EGYPT, AND NOT BY US AND THE SOVIET UNION. A BIG STEP FORWARD WAS MADE TOWARD SETTLING THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WHEN SADAT RECOGNIZED HE HOLDS ONE OF THE KEYS TO IT AND BEGAN DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL. UNFORTUNATELY, SADAT STOPPED SHORT ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVING THIS GOAL. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE TALKS MOVING AGAIN BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, BUT TO TELL THE TRUTH - AS WAS EMPHASIZED BY THE TALKS WITH BEGIN AND SADAT - I DO NOT CONSIDER EITHER BEGIN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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OR SADAT SUITABLE FOR THE TASK, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE AS EVERYONE KNOWS BEGIN HAS A TERMINAL ILLNESS, AND ALL SADAT'S ENERGY IS PINNED DOWN BY HIS DOMESTIC WORRIES, AND HE PROBABLY WON'T BE ABLE TO STAND UP LONG IN THE FACE OF HIS INTERNAL OPPOSITION. SO THERE IS GOOD REASON TO EXPECT SHIFTS IN PERSONALITIES IN THE TWO COUNTRIES INVOLVED. SHOULD CHANGES OF THIS NATURE OCCUR, WE WOULD WELCOME AT THE HEAD OF BOTH COUNTRIES EXPERIENCED AND UNBIASED POLITICIANS ABLE TO PURSUE A REALISTIC POLICY AND WILLING TO MUTUALLY AND PEACEFULLY SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES. THIS WOULD CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS A WHOLE.

Q. BY REALISTIC POLITICANS WHOM DO YOU HAVE IN MIND?

A. YOU'VE GOT ME THERE BECAUSE AT THE MOMENT IT WOULD BE HARD TO MENTION A CONCRETE NAME. NOW HOW SHOULD I PUT IT...IN EGYPT MAYBE IT COULD MEAN A MAN LIKE FAHMI.

Q. YOU MENTIONED THAT BASICALLY IT WAS NOT UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO SOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. BY THAT DO YOU IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PLAY THE ROLE OF A PASSIVE ONLOOKER?

A. NOT AT ALL, I DIDN'T SAY THAT. AS IS CLEARLY APPARENT, WE ALSO HAVE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE AREA SO ANY IDES WE HAVE
FOR A SETTLEMENT WILL TAKE THE INTERESTS OF THE OIL
PRODUCING COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL INTO CONSIDERATION.
Q. THEREFORE, TWO OPPOSITE POLES, OR TO BE MORE
PRECISE OIL AND ISRAEL OR THE ISRAELI LOBBY, PLAY A
LARGE PART IN THE UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SETTLEMENT?

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SS-15 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SY-05 ACDA-12 EA-10
AF-10 MCT-01 /116 W
-----000347 131829Z /53

P 131700Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO USICA WASHDC PRIORITY
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A. THAT'S EXACTLY IT.

Q. AND TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT
HELPED OR HINDERED BY AMERICA SHIPPING ARMS TO BOTH
SIDES?

A. AS TO HINDERING, IT DOES NOT HINDER BY ANY MEANS;
IT FACT I MAY SAY IT HELPS, BECAUSE OUR REASON
FOR SENDING WEAPONS TO BOTH SIDES IS TO CREATE A BALANCE
IN THE REGION WHICH WILL ASSURE A FIRM PEACE.

Q. ASIA HAS TRADITIONALLY HAD AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PAST. IS THAT STILL TRUE
TODAY?

A. YES, OF COURSE. ASIA CONTINUES TO PLAY AN
IMPORTANT PART IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY. I AM THINKING
FIRST OF ALL OF JAPAN AND CHINA, BUT I WOULD NOT WANT
TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION I AM BELITTling THE IMPORTANCE

OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF ASIA TO OUR POLICY IN ASIA.
WE ARE COMMITTED TO GUARANTEEING THAT THIS MUCH
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SUFFERED REGION WILL BECOME A SYMBOL OF THE POLICY
OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THAT IS WHY WE ARE MAKING
SERIOUS EFFORTS TO SETTLE OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH
VIETNAM EITHER THIS YEAR OR EARLY NEXT YEAR. WE
MUST, OF COURSE, RELY BASICALLY ON JAPAN AND CHINA
IN ACHIEVING OUR POLICY IN ASIA. ONE MAJOR TASK IN
THIS REGION IS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM
STARTING LOCAL WARS TO BUILD UP THEIR INFLUENCE,
LIKE THEY ARE DOING IN AFRICA. AS A MATTER OF FACT,
THAT IS THE GUARANTEE OF PEACE IN ASIA. CHINA'S
LEADERS ARE OF THE SAME OPINION AND IT IS NO ACCIDENT
WE WERE ABLE TO FIND A COMMON TONE. WE HAVE COMMON
INTERESTS IN SEVERAL AREAS AND WILL HAVE TO COORDINATE
MANY ASPECTS OF OUR POLICY IN THE FUTURE.

Q. WESTERN EUROPE IS CONTENDING WITH A RISE IN
TERRORISM. WHAT ARE YOUR THOUGHTS ON TERRORISM?

A. YES, THE SPREAD OF TERRORISM THROUGHOUT WESTERN
EUROPE IS A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO ITS GOVERNMENTS. BUT
I HAVE CONFIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, I FEEL
IT IS A BARRIER TO THIS NEW WAVE OF TERRORISM.

Q. MANY PEOPLE BELIEVE THESE ACTS OF TERRORISM ARE
BACKED BY CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE
CIA.

A. RUBBISH, SHEER NONSENSE. AFTER ALL, WHAT
INTEREST COULD ANY COUNTRY HAVE IN ITS INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY UNDERTAKING A RISK OF THAT KIND. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES DO NOT EXIST TO GET SOME DEGENERATES TO
KIDNAP AND MURDER PROMINENT OFFICIALS. END QUOTE
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, FORGERY, PRESS CONFERENCES, ALLEGATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978PARIS22240
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780287-0751
Format: TEL
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780764/aaaacbvy.tel
Line Count: 315
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 554fda75-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: N/A
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2020887
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FORGED INTERVIEW WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE
TAGS: SOPN, PEPR, US, (MONDALE, WALTER F), (DOUGLAS, KARL)
To: ICA STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/554fda75-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014